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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine and explain the 
Congressional vote on the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
It focuses on the bargaining techniques employed by the 
President to secure the passage of NAFTA and their ultimate 
effectiveness.
It seems that the presidents most effective bargaining 
tool, when trying to pass treaty legislation, is to be 
flexible about the exact terms of the treaty. Although many 
believe side payments or "pork barrel" benefits to be the most 
important way presidents win support for treaties, results 
from empirical research in this study suggest they are less 
important than specific modifications in the terms of the 
treaty itself, especially on an emotional and divisive issue.
Additionally, an individual legislator’s probability of 
voting for or against NAFTA is calculated by examining 
variables including partisan affiliation, geographic region 
represented, financial support from labor unions, education 
level of the district, district support for Perot in the 1992 
election, margin of victory in the last election, number of 
terms served, membership in the black caucus, and finally, 
whether or not a representative received either "pork" and/or 
modification in the terms of the treaty.
Results suggest a representative from an educated 
republican district in the West Coast, southeast, or bordering 
Mexico who receives little or no money from labor unions, and 
won concessions from the administration on the exact terms of 
the treaty would be most likely to vote for NAFTA.
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POLICY, PORK, AND PRIVILEGE: 
PRESIDENTIAL LOBBYING FOR NAFTA
Although the founding fathers did not envision it, the 
president plays an important role in the legislative process. 
He is expected to formulate an agenda, coordinate policies, 
introduce them to Congress, and mobilize the support of the 
general public. Because his agenda is translated into 
legislation, the president cannot operate independently of 
Congress. He thus requires the cooperation of Congress, 
although he cannot always count on it. Consequently, one of 
the president's most important and difficult tasks is 
persuading Congress to support his policies.
The difficulty of this task was recently demonstrated by 
the Clinton -administration's effort to ensure the passage of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The 
agreement is certainly one of the most controversial pieces of 
legislation placed before the 103rd Congress. Members of 
Congress and their constituents were divided; the Clinton 
administration sought to mobilize support for the agreement 
and ended up expending a great deal of political capital to 
secure passage of the agreement. The task was especially 
difficult because the president could not count on the support 
of Democrats in Congress. In fact, David Bonior, the majority 
whip, was one of the most vocal opponents of NAFTA and 
organized opposition to the agreement in the House of 
Representatives. He even claimed to have secured defeat of
3the agreement well into November.1
How, then, was President Clinton able to pass such an 
agreement? Conventional wisdom claims that the White House 
regularly "buys" votes through deals struck with members of 
Congress. In other words, strategically placed legislators
can delay or vote against important legislation unless or
until they receive distributive benefits, usually in the form 
of district projects. These projects are sometimes viewed as 
bribes. In the case of NAFTA, it seems that the president had 
to "buy" passage of the agreement vote by vote. What made 
President Clinton willing to make the deals he did? Why 
couldn't he rely on other traditional means to build a 
coalition in Congress, such as party and ideology?
This paper address these questions. It will focus on the 
uses of bargaining (modifications of the treaty), distributive 
benefits (side payments or "pork barrel") and favors 
(miscellaneous services and amenities) to secure the passage
of NAFTA. It will examine the different bargaining methods
employed and test the effectiveness of these methods on the 
final vote. This test will focus on undecided members of 
Congress who managed to win concessions from the president. 
I will describe the nature of these concessions and propose a 
probit model that will attempt to explain how important they 
ultimately were to the passage of NAFTA. Finally, I will
1||The Great NAFTA Bazaar," The Economist. 13 November 
1993, 32.
A
discuss the implications of different methods of political 
dealmaking on current and future trade and treaty legislation.
It seems that the presidents most effective bargaining 
tool, when trying to pass treaty legislation, is to be 
flexible about the exact terms of the treaty. Flexibility 
implies a president's willingness or ability to compromise on 
policy terms in an attempt to find common ground with other 
policy actors. For although many believe side payments or 
distributive benefits to be the most important political 
"lubricant," the results of this study demonstrate the 
importance of specific modifications in the terms of the 
treaty itself. If a president seeks an alternative to side 
payments or miscellaneous favors when dealing with congress, 
a willingness to modify legislation seems to be an effective 
option.
The President and Congress
According to Richard Neustadt, the founding fathers did 
not create a government of separated powers. Instead, they 
created a government of separated institutions sharing 
powers.2 Many of the powers of both the executive and 
legislative branches of government overlap. For example, the 
Constitution empowers the president to conduct foreign 
affairs, which includes trade agreements, while Congress is
2Richard Neustadt, "The Power to Persuade," in The 
American Presidency: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 
ed. Harry A. Bailey and Jay M. Shafritz (Chicago: The Dorsey 
Press, 1988), 421.
5given the. authority to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations.3
Although the evolution of the modern presidency has led 
many to believe the president has a broad mandate for 
legislative action, his constitutional powers are quite 
limited. Only four responsibilities and duties were written 
in Article 2 of the Constitution. He is to inform Congress 
from time to time on the state of the union. He is empowered 
to recommend necessary and expedient legislation. He can ) 
summon Congress into special session and adjourn it if the two 
houses cannot agree on adjournment. Finally, the president 
can exercise a qualified veto.4
Over the years presidents have taken prerogative powers 
and expanded their influence. They have used their 
legislative responsibilities to increase their influence in 
Congress. For example, today the State of the Union address 
is used as a tool with which the president can articulate the 
legislative goals of his administration, recite his 
accomplishments, present his agenda, and attempt to mobilize 
support for his programs.5 In much the same way, presidents 
have transformed their duty to recommend "necessary and
3George Grayson, "The North American Free Trade 
Agreement," Headline Series 299, (New York, Foreign Policy 
Association, 1992), 17.
4George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential 
Leadership: Politics and Policymaking. (New York: Saint
Martin's Press, 1990), 283.
5I b i d .
expedient” legislation into an agenda setting activity. 
Presidential Power in Legislating Trade and Foreign Policy
The president is also empowered to make treaties. This
power is to be executed jointly with the Senate. The
president, however, does not usually involve the Senate in 
treaty negotiations. Since 1789, the Senate has approved 
without modification about seventy percent of the
approximately fifteen hundred treaties presidents have
historically submitted.6 Only sixteen that came to a vote 
were voted down. Other proposed treaties, however, have been 
withdrawn by presidents because of opposition in the Senate. 
Around one hundred and fifty have been withdrawn since World 
War II.7 ■ In addition to simply approving or rejecting 
treaties, the Senate can approve them with reservations or 
amendments. Once a treaty has been amended, though, it 
usually must go back to the president and the other countries 
for consideration. These additions or deletions are not 
always accepted and thus many treaties have failed for this 
reason.
The president's authority in foreign affairs has 
increased a great deal in recent years. As the United States 
becomes increasingly involved in the international community, 
the public wants strong, personal leadership to direct that
6Ibid., 406.
7Ibid.
7involvement.8 Additionally, certain negotiations cannot be 
handled by a large group of people (like the Senate). For 
this reason the president needs to acquire the power to 
bargain without overt Senate interference. A president can 
circumvent Congress by forging an executive agreement? 
however, if he wants his agreement to last beyond his 
administration he must face Congress. Congress can give 
presidents the authority and freedom they need to negotiate in 
a number of ways.
One way Congress can give presidents more freedom and 
credibility in the negotiations of foreign and trade policy is 
by a mechanism called "fast track," which was created out of 
the Trade Act of 1974. This mechanism allows presidential 
representatives to negotiate a trade deal with one or more 
foreign governments. Congress must then accept or reject the 
deal these representatives have forged without change.9 The 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 further stated 
that "fast track authority could be extended for two years if 
the president so requested, provided, of course, that neither 
a key committee nor either legislative chamber passed a 
disallowing resolution within 90 days of the White House 
request."10 With Congressional approval, fast track
procedural protection applies to any trade agreement submitted
8Ibid., 415.
9Grayson, 18.
10Ibid.
90 days before the expiration of the expedited authority. As 
part of the fast track process, the president should provide 
at least sixty days notice to the House Ways and Means and the 
Senate Finance Committees of his intention to begin trade 
negotiations. After an agreement has been reached, the 
president submits an implementing bill drafted with 
Congressional leaders, a statement of administrative action 
suggested to implement the accord, and detailed supporting 
information that explains how the agreement meets U.S. trade 
and negotiating objectives to both houses of Congress.11 On 
May 23, 1991, President Bush secured fast track approval to 
negotiate NAFTA.12 "Fast tracking" is important because it 
allows the president more freedom in his negotiations. It is, 
however, a double edged sword. Congress may let the president 
negotiate the treaty without interference but members are more 
likely to demand favors and concessions to pass the agreement 
when it comes to a final vote. Congress can thus still affect 
the final provisions of the bill.
Sources of Conflict: Congress and the President
Because Congress and the executive have overlapping 
responsibilities and different constituencies and 
perspectives, conflicts between the two are bound to arise. 
According to James Madison in "The Federalist No. 46:"
11Ibid. , 18-9.
12David S. Cloud, "The History of the Deal," Congressional 
Quarterly (20 November 1993) 3180.
9The members of the federal legislature will likely attach 
themselves too much to local objects. . . Measures will 
too often be decided according to their probable effect, 
not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the 
prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments 
and the people of the individual states.13
Because the president is elected by the nation as a whole, he
must appeal to a broader electoral coalition than members of
Congress. He represents the larger national interest.
Consequently, "the whole that the president represents is
different from the sum of the parts that each legislator
represents.1,14
The different internal structures of the two branches of 
government can also cause conflict between Congress and the 
president. The executive branch is hierarchically organized. 
This structure helps the president view trade offs between 
various policies.15 He weighs and balances the various 
interests. Congress, on the other hand, is highly
decentralized. Neither parties nor committees especially 
unify Congress. One consequence of this decentralization is 
the specialization of members of Congress in certain policy 
areas. Congress usually considers policies without reference 
to other policies. The structure of Congress ensures that a 
diversity of opinions will be heard but it does not mean that 
each member will hear all views. After leaving the White
13James Madison, "The Federalist No. 46," in The 
Federalist (New York: Modern Library, 1937), 307.
14Edwards and Wayne, 285.
15I b i d .
10
House Gerald Ford wrote:
It seemed to me that Congress was beginning to 
disintegrate as an organized legislative body. It wasn*t 
answering the nation*s challenges domestically because it 
was too fragmented. It responded too often to single­
issue special interest groups and it therefore wound up 
dealing with minutiae instead of attacking serious 
problems in a coherent way.16
Similarly, the president must also consider the influence of
these interest groups when he tries to build a coalition.
Conflict: Presidential Policies and Party Support
"I learned the hard way that there was no party loyalty or
discipline when a complicated or controversial issue was at
stake- none."17 -Jimmy Carter
Unfortunately for them, presidents cannot simply assume 
support from members of their party in Congress. Conventional 
wisdom holds that members of their own party in Congress 
provide presidents with a base upon which to build majority 
coalitions. Party members should be predisposed to support 
the president because they must satisfy similar electoral 
coalitions, they must run in part on the record of the 
president, they are members of the same "political family," 
and finally, the president has the use of political resources
16Ibid.
17Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New 
York: Bantam, 1982), 80.
11
to reward and punish members of Congress.18 According to 
Richard Neustadt, though, "what the Constitution separates our 
political parties do not combine."19
Recent literature and evidence in Congress refute this 
conventional wisdom. Compared to other Western democracies, 
American parties are weaker and less disciplined. According 
to Edwards and Wayne, "The primary obstacle to party cohesion 
in support of the president is the lack of consensus among his 
party's members on policies. . . This diversity of views often 
reflects the diversity of constituencies represented by party 
members."20 If constituency opinion conflicts with
presidential opinion, members of Congress are most likely to 
vote with their constituencies because they seek reelection. 
Gerald Ford lamented the changes in Congress which resulted in 
"loss of clout" and the absence of teamwork and team spirit. 
He writes:
The main reason for this change is the erosion of the 
leadership in the Congress. Party leaders have lost the 
power to tell their troops that something is really 
significant and get them to respond accordingly. The 
days of Sam Rayburn, Lyndon Johnson and Everett Dirkson 
are gone. That has adversely affected the Congress's 
ability to do things even in very difficult circumstances 
involving the national interest.21
18Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the 
Legislative Arena. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1990), 15-6.
19Neustadt, 421.
20Edwards and Wayne, 293.
21I b i d . , 2 9 1
Similarly, the president cannot rely on party floor 
leaders, committee chairs and ranking members of Congress. 
One reason for this is the increased dispersion of power in 
Congress. Committee chairs must be responsive to subcommittee 
members, who have gained more power in recent years. 
Additionally, the president's program is subject to more 
cross-cutting demands within Congress because of split and 
joint committee referrals for some legislation. Other reforms 
like the increased number of roll call votes and the 
subsequent traceability of representative's voting behavior 
has placed more pressure on House members to abandon party 
loyalty. Finally, with the high turnover of representatives 
in recent years, new members have brought new approaches to 
legislating. They are less likely to adopt the norms of 
apprenticeship and specialization? instead, they have taken an 
active role in all legislation and place emphasis on 
individualism rather than party regularity.22 For these
reasons, it has become more difficult presidents to pass 
legislation if they rely solely on party support. Presidents 
must now seek complementary or alternative ways to build a 
coalition.
Coalition Building
What recourse does a president have when his party fails 
to support him? What tools does a president have to build a 
supportive coalition? Christopher Deering writes that
22Ibid. , 292
13
coalitions in Congress today are "fluid, with their 
dependability tied to the particular set of issues in 
play."23 Current literature also suggests popularity and 
public support, Congressional liaisons and consultation, 
services and amenities, and pressure and bargaining.
Lyndon Johnson believed "Presidential popularity is a 
major source of strength in gaining cooperation from 
Congress."24 Presidential popularity suggests broad public 
support. The public's evaluations of the president must be 
taken into account by members of Congress because they wish to 
increase their chances of reelection and perhaps believe they 
must reflect constituency opinion. Bond and Fleisher found 
that empirical evidence presented by researchers trying to 
demonstrate a strong relationship between approval and support 
in Congress have been mixed.25 They suggest other 
considerations such as the different behaviors exhibited by 
popular and unpopular presidents in their dealings with 
Congress. They also suggest opposition members have little to 
gain by supporting the president because they will perhaps 
help reelect the opposition's administration.
Presidents also rely on a Congressional liaison staff to 
facilitate support. The Congressional liaison is a bridge
23Healy and Moore, 3181.
24Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspective of the 
Presidency. 1963-1969 (New York: Popular Library, 1971) 443.
25Bond and Fleisher, 25.
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between Congress and the president. The staff actually
serves the needs of both the executive and legislative 
branches. For Congress, it helps integrate the views of
Congress into executive policy making, forces the president to 
state his views, serves constituency needs, and provides 
channels for making compromises. For the president, it 
allows him to gain a legislative perspective, to communicate 
his view to Congress, mobilize support, and overcome
obstacles.26
The other recourses suggested are all specific
legislative techniques a president must usually employ to win 
support for his proposals. According to Richard Neustadt, 
"When the chips are down, there is no substitute for the 
President's own footwork, his personal negotiation, his direct 
appeal, his voice and no other on the telephone.1,27 Usually 
presidents become intensely involved only after a long process 
of winning votes is almost over and their personal attentions 
are needed to swing an important vote. Presidents tend to 
focus on key members of Congress, who will serve as cues to 
other members, and members who are undecided or weak in their 
preferences. Despite their prestige and persuasiveness, 
though, presidents often fail in their personal appeals.
Another possible method is the granting of services and 
amenities to promote "good will" and ultimately support.
26Edwards and Wayne, 303.
27Neustadt, 423.
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These include social contact with the president, rides on Air 
Force One, birthday greetings, theater tickets for the 
j presidential box and any number of other favors.28 Favors 
can also include assisting members of Congress cater to their 
constituents. These favors consist of meeting constituents, 
dispensing presidential photos and memorabilia, and promising 
other favors. Campaign aid is one important favor the 
president can offer a member of Congress. This aid comes in 
various forms, including campaign speeches by the president 
for Congressional candidates, funds and advice from party 
national committees, presidential endorsements and letters of 
appreciation from the president.29 Presidents can also 
pressure members of Congress by denying them favors. A 
president can make himself unavailable to certain members of 
Congress, exclude a member from White House social events, or 
deny routine requests for White House tour tickets. These 
"sanctions," though, are used less frequently than favors.
Finally, an administration can bargain with members of 
Congress to gain support. This is usually considered "buying 
votes" by granting special concessions, trading support on two 
or more policies, or distributing pork. David Stockman, 
Reagan's budget director, claimed that on the 1981 tax cut, 
"the last ten or twenty percent of the votes needed for a
28Ibid. , 306.
29Ibid.
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majority in both houses had to be bought, period.”30 Broadly 
defined, pork is "spending in circumvention of established 
budgetary procedures, or the use of federal money for projects 
of only local interest."31
The President is limited in his ability to distribute 
concessions for a number of reasons. First, his resources are 
limited. There are only a certain number of appointive jobs 
available and the federal budget is limited. Second, public 
works funding is controlled by Congress. Third, if a 
President strikes too many direct deals, "word will rapidly 
spread, and everyone will want to trade, and persuasive 
efforts will fail."32 Traditionally, though, this type of 
dealing lacks a certain respectability.
Logrolling and Coalition Building
Although few have formally recognized it, distributive 
logrolling helps legislative leaders form coalitions in order 
to pass general interest legislation with broad national 
effects. This is accomplished by attaching a set of 
distributive benefits onto the legislation with the intention 
of winning the votes of necessary members of Congress. 
Ideally, benefits are conferred upon a constituency small 
enough to allow a single representative to be recognized as
30Edwards and Wayne, 304.
31 "1994 Congressional Pig Book Summary," Citizens Against 
Government Waste. 1.
32Ibid.
the benefactor. Moreover, constituents should believe that 
the representative was responsible for the allocation. 
Finally, the costs resulting from the project should be widely 
diffused or somehow obscured from taxpayer notice. The use of 
this strategy ensures the coalition leaders achieve their 
original policy goal and individual legislators reap electoral 
benefits in the future. One condition to the success of this 
strategy is an asymmetry of interest intensity. The 
distributive benefits offered to individual legislators must 
be more important to them than their opposition to the 
proposed policy.
Additionally, the use of "side payments" can help limit 
the amount of negotiations and compromises necessary to pass 
legislation. Coalition leaders need not make a number of 
substantive changes in their bill and can thus more 
effectively achieve their original policy goal. From this 
perspective, "the real value of pork projects ultimately lies 
in their ability to induce rational legislators into taking 
electorally risky actions for the sake of the public good."33 
Unfortunately, however, distributive benefits usually increase 
the overall cost of the bill.
Logrolling In Congress: Policy Goals and Pork
Members of Congress have been criticized for catering to 
their constituencies while ignoring greater national
33JOhn. W. Ellwood and Eric M. Patashnik, "In Praise of 
Pork," The Public Interest 110 (Winter 1993): 32.
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interests. In other words, they protect their electoral 
interests by securing distributive benefits for their 
districts at great public expense while ignoring general 
interest legislation.34 (Distributive policy refers to 
policy that targets discrete benefits to one specific 
population so that the amounts for one beneficiary can be 
changed without affecting the amounts given to others while 
costs are spread across the general population.)35 The 
distributive policy product and process are frequently termed 
pork barrel policy. Morris Fiorina claims that
constituents depend upon their representatives to provide 
these distributive benefits to a greater extent than ever 
before.36 A study of the House Public Works Committee
discovered members highly valued the "tangible political
\
consequences of delivering for the district."37 As David 
Mayhew points out, members of Congress rely on constituent 
gratitude to contribute to their continued electoral security. 
Because reelection is a legislator's predominant goal, their
34David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
35Melissa Collie, "The Legislature and Distributive Policy 
Making in Formal Perspective," Legislative Studies Quarterly 
13: 427-458.
36Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone to the Washington 
Establishment. (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1977.
37James T. Murphy, "Political Parties and Pork Barrel: 
Party Conflict and Cooperation in the House Public Works 
Committee Decision Making," American Political Science Review. 
68: p.171.
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voting decisions are made in large part by calculating which 
alternative contributes more to their chances for 
reelection.38
Members of Congress are motivated by any number of 
personal goals. Studies have revealed these goals to be 
primarily reelection, good public policy, and influence within 
the Congress.39 Other goals include personal power and the 
ability to "leave a mark" in a certain policy area. A great 
deal of recent literature stresses the primacy of the 
reelection goal? certainly this is because unless a member is 
elected to office, he or she cannot pursue their other goals. 
In any case, political actors who control benefits that effect 
members' electoral chances wield a great deal of power.
Empirical studies have documented the power and 
advantages of certain members of Congress who occupy strategic 
Congressional positions which give them the ability to bring 
projects to their districts. For example, Bruce Ray writes, 
"jurisdictional elites, who have the power to shape national 
policy, also occupy the influential institutional positions 
whose powers may be used to dictate the distribution of 
specific program benefits. . . .they maximize federal
38R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, 7.
39Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
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spending within their constituencies.1,40
Along the same vein, R. Douglas Arnold argued that 
executive agencies allocate district projects so as to 
maintain supporting coalitions in Congress for the agencies' 
programs.41 Many of these programs contain general benefits; 
thus, there is evidence that distributive benefits play an 
important role in general interest legislation. Ferejohn 
argues that strategically placed legislators, as members of a 
"formable minimal winning coalition" can delay even general 
interest legislation unless or until they receive bribes, 
usually in the form of district projects.
However, another type of "bribe" is available? specific 
parts of the bill can be modified to attract the support of 
certain legislators. This type of delay could be seen in the 
1986 effort to reform the tax code. This broad general 
interest legislation certainly removed a number of tax breaks 
for special interests; however, in order to pass the bill the 
chairs of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee had to append a set of "transition rules" 
which included nearly 700 "exceptions" with a five year cost 
of eleven million dollars.42
40Bruce A. Ray, "Congressional Promotion of District 
Interests: Does Power on the Hill Really Make a Difference?" 
in Political Benefits, ed. Barry S. Rundquist, Lexington: 
Lexington Books, 1980.
41R. Douglas Arnold, Congress and the Bureaucracy (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
42Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action. 218.
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Empirical Study of the Effect of Bargaining
Matthew R. Kerbel tries to test the common thesis that 
presidential power is the power to persuade. He examines 
persuasion as function of presidential bargaining and finds 
that "bargaining plays a central role in the domestic policy 
outcomes achieved by recent presidents."43
Kerbel believes the president has two resources with 
which to bargain: personal flexibility and the use of favors. 
Personal flexibility addresses a president*s willingness or 
ability to compromise or change course in an attempt to find 
common ground with other policy actors and the ability to bend 
with changing events. Favors are the tangible perks
available to the president by virtue of his position; they run 
the gamut from small personal mementoes to active presidential 
support for valued projects in certain states or Congressional 
districts. Kerbel conducts an empirical study examining the 
effect of personal flexibility and the use of favors on the 
policy outcomes a president attains. Kerbel found great 
variation in the way past presidents employed favors. In his 
analysis of presidents Carter and Reagan he found that in 
their policy successes, both presidents were perceived to rely 
consistently on favors (Carter 70% of the time, Reagan 96% of 
the time.)44 This is in marked contrast to failed policies,
43Matthew R. Kerbel, "An Empirical Test of the Role of 
Persuasion in the Exercise of Presidential Power," 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 2 (Spring 1993), 355.
44Ibid.
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where the emphasis in the records was on the absence of 
favors.
In conclusion, Kerbel writes:
Perhaps the most striking thing about bargaining is the 
extent to which it is related to the outcomes recent 
presidents have achieved. Carter and Reagan serve as 
good illustrations. By and large, when they were 
flexible and served up the perks of their office, they 
subsequently achieved their policy ends. When they were 
unyielding and did not employ favors, they realized less 
fortunate results. . . .A president who knows how to uses 
these tools will be able to increase his persuasive 
power.45
In a final point, Kerbel states that no president uses 
his bargaining resources to their fullest extent all the time. 
Willingness to bargain varies with the situation at hand. 
Sometimes presidents are strongly committed to certain ideas 
and are subsequently less inclined to compromise and bargain. 
Circumstance and necessity seem to play a large role in the 
decision to use bargaining. Resources, as discussed before, 
are limited. "To throw favors at policy actors every time 
something important comes along is to devalue the 
resource."46 Knowing what will work and knowing how and when 
to use what will work is part of the skill of politics.
Edwards and Wayne claim bargaining "occurs less often and 
plays a less critical role in the creation of presidential 
coalition in Congress than one might think."47 Public
45Ibid, 358.
46Ibid. , 359.
47Edwards and Wayne, 3 05.
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Citizen, a non-profit organization representing consumer 
interests, claimed that the political dealmaking used to pass 
NAFTA "was anything but business as usual."48 It seems that 
these claims are false. Perhaps the dealmaking itself was 
more obvious and explicit but it did indeed seem to be 
"business as usual." Given the emotional level of the 
proponents and opponents of the agreement, in addition to 
extensive media coverage, and it appears that deals were often 
portrayed as pacts with the devil. Rep. Tom Lewis (R-FL) 
said, "It looks like you're selling your soul."49
Congress and NAFTA 
This paper will now discuss the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and its travels through Congress. As an
international trade agreement, NAFTA had to be negotiated
*
between Mexico, Canada, and the United States. These 
negotiations had to be accepted by Congress in their entirety 
because of "fast track" power given to the president. 
However, in order to build a supportive coalition to pass 
NAFTA, the president had to modify the agreement. For 
example, in order to win support from legislators whose states 
produced sugar, the administration extracted a commitment 
created to prevent Mexico from exporting sugar to the U.S. in
48Gabriel Boyer, Lori Wallach and Nancy Watzman, "NAFTA's 
Bizarre Bazaar: The Deal Making that Bought Congressional
Votes on the North American Free Trade Agreement," Public 
Citizen (December 1993), i.
49I b i d . , 1 .
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the indefinite future. Mexico agreed to these terms under a 
last minute deal negotiated by U.S. Trade Representative 
Mickey Kantor. Similarly, the administration agreed to 
reinstate tariffs on certain Mexican vegetables in an 
expedited procedure designed specifically for perishable foods 
in case of a sudden flood of imports. Additionally, the 
administration agreed to work out a system under which the 
price of orange juice concentrate would be tracked on the New 
York Stock Exchange. If it fell below a certain level, 
tariffs could be reinstated on Mexican imports.
These compromises were important because they made the 
trade agreement more attractive to members of Congress. 
However, the purpose of fast track authority is to allow the 
president more freedom to negotiate a trade deal without the 
direct influence of Congress. Often, side payments or 
distributive benefits are used to win the votes of legislators 
instead of modifying the terms of a treaty. If Congress 
continues to amend the treaty, it must go back to the 
president and the other countries for consideration. This 
makes it difficult to turn the treaty into law.
In the case of NAFTA, it is clear that the president had 
to modify the terms of the treaty to garner support in 
Congress. If NAFTA is any example for future legislation, it 
seems that the president must understand the wishes of 
legislators before he begins negotiations, even if he secures 
fast track authority. In fact, the data at hand suggest that
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modifications are even more important to members of Congress 
than side payments or distributive benefits. If a president 
does not consider the wishes of Congress, he will either not 
be able to pass the treaty or he will be forced to renegotiate 
the terms at the risk of appearing indecisive, weak or 
whimsical. By understanding the what bargaining tactics to 
employ, presidents can negotiate treaties which are more 
likely to pass Congress, while expending the least amount of 
political capital and enhancing the president's reputation.
President Clinton relied on flexibility, side payments 
and favors to pass NAFTA. These methods fall under a larger 
heading: presidential powers of persuasion. Flexibility I 
define as willingness to amend the agreement, side payments 
are defined as any particularistic benefit conferred, and 
favors include any miscellaneous non-financial promise made, 
ranging from social invitations to promised campaign support 
to the guarantee to extradite art accused rapist. Although a 
comprehensive list of favors has not yet been compiled, 
newspapers, magazines and interest groups provide an 
impressive record of these deals. I will discuss some of the 
deals and concessions the Clinton administration made to 
various members of Congress. Because passage of the agreement 
seemed relatively secure in the Senate, I will focus my 
attentions on the House. Finally, I will suggest a probit 
model to test my hypothesis because the dependent variable, 
the vote on NAFTA, is dichotomous. My dependent variable is
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a vote for or against the president. My independent variables 
include changes in the terms of the agreement (flexibility), 
financial deals unrelated to the agreement (side payments or 
pork) and miscellaneous favors provided by the administration.
Clinton. Congress, and NAFTA
President Clinton inherited an already negotiated NAFTA
from his predecessor, George Bush. Clinton promised to
support the agreement but he also declared that the agreement
needed some modifications through side deals to improve worker
rights and environmental protection. This apparently was the
president's way of trying to defuse opposition from the
Democratic Party, the environmental community and organized
labor.50 As a political strategy, it backfired. It
contributed to the idea that there was something wrong with
the agreement, raised expectations that these "problems" could
be fixed, and mobilized opponents.
Because he lacked Democratic support in Congress, Clinton
had to find another way to build a coalition. Every district
had different interests and the issue became an emotional one.
According to Congressional Quarterly;
NAFTA is a tough challenge for the art of Congressional 
arm twisting. Proponents are trying to sell a policy 
with global economic implications to lawmakers for whom 
all politics are local. This is not the kind of issue 
that can be won by appealing to voting blocs. Every 
vote is being won and lost by intense person-by-person
50Cloud, 2791.
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persuasion.51
This person by person persuasion was made even more 
difficult because Majority Whip David E. Bonior of Michigan 
was opposed to the pact and organized opposition in the House. 
Thus pro-NAFTA Democrats had to create their own ad hoc whip 
organization. This was set up by the administration, U.S. 
Trade Representative Mickey Cantor and special advisor William 
R. Daley. Reps. Bill Richardson (D-NM) , one of four chief 
deputy whips, and Robert Matsui (D-CA), a member of the Ways 
and Means Committee, coordinated efforts for NAFTA in the 
House.52 Republicans organized their own whip operation, but 
the leadership structures of the two parties worked together 
and shared responsibility for the pact. Each party had to 
muster around 110 votes to add up to the 218 needed to approve 
NAFTA.
Because the issue was so emotional and divisive the 
president could not rely on his popularity or public support 
to win votes. In fact, many democratic voters felt betrayed 
by President Clinton because of his support for NAFTA. 
Moreover, popularity is usually only a marginal factor in 
gaining support for the president's policies and the emotional 
responses to the issue overrode any influence popularity might 
have had on legislators.
51 Janet Hook, "The Uphill Battle for Votes Produces A 
Whirl of Wooing and Wheedling," Congressional Quarterly (6
November, 1993), 3014.
52I b i d .
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NAFTA supporters primarily focused their efforts on 
persuading pivotal members of Congress who would serve as cue 
givers to undecided members. These representatives included 
Henry A. Waxman of California, a senior member influential 
among liberals and environmentalists. He "gave cover" to 
about ten other environmentalists who claimed to be undecided 
because of him.53 Additionally, NAFTA supporters hoped some 
wavering Illinois Democrats would support the agreement after 
the state's Democratic senators announced their support. 
Supporters also tried to sway Illinois Democrat George E. 
Sangmeister, along with eighteen other House members by taking 
them on a trip to Mexico the weekend of October 23, 1993.54
Administration officials worked hard to win the vote of Rep. 
Esteban E. Torres (D-CA) because they thought he would help 
win more Hispanic Votes as well. The administration promised 
the creation of a development bank on the Mexican border (for 
which Torres would be given credit) in addition to millions of 
extra dollars to help poor communities hurt by NAFTA. 
Unfortunately for the administration, "when NAFTA advocates 
have reeled in members regarded as big fish, they sometimes 
have been disappointed with the haul."55
As November 17th grew closer, President Clinton began
53Ibid.
54Phil Duncan, "Undecideds Are Final Target in Battle Over
Trade Pact," Congressional Quarterly. 6 November 1993, 3014.
55I b i d .
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bargaining in earnest. His bargains included changes in the 
agreement, "pork" and miscellaneous favors dispensed to 
undecided members of Congress. I have compiled a list of 
these bargains and separated them into the aforementioned 
three categories. Records of these deals were taken from the 
press (Congressional Quarterly. The Nation. The Economists and 
from groups like Public Citizen and the Committee for 
Responsive Politics. This list is appended to the paper. I 
use a probit model to test the effectiveness of these deals. 
A probit analysis is analogous to a multivariate regression 
analysis when the dependent variable is dichotomous. Both a 
logit and a probit analysis were executed.56 The results 
were almost identical; for simplicity only the probit model is 
included in the final paper. Support for NAFTA by members of 
Congress should be determined by the following factors: side 
payments, modifications to the treaty, miscellaneous favors, 
geography, labor money, Perot support, margin of victory in 
the last election, party affiliation, membership in the 
Congressional Black Caucus, educational level of individual 
districts, and seniority of members of Congress measured by 
numbers of terms served.
The variable particularistic benefits refers to side 
payments obtained by members of Congress. The representatives 
receiving, them are listed in 11 NAFTA Deals," appended to the
56Both logit and probit are designed for dichotomous 
independent variables. The only difference between the two is 
in the angle of the 1 z* shaped curve.
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paper. Members receiving them would be assigned a value of 
one; members who did not would be assigned a value of zero. 
Side payments do not include members of Congress who asked for 
favors but did not receive them. For example, the North 
Carolina delegation asked president Clinton for a reduction in 
a proposed cigarette tax but their request was denied. This 
variable focuses only on members who received side payments. 
I hypothesize that members who received benefits would be more 
inclined to support NAFTA.
The variable modifications refers to changes made in the 
trade agreement itself in order to win votes. Members of 
Congress who won or benefitted from modifications would be 
assigned a value of one, other members would receive a coding 
of zero.
Miscellaneous favors refer to non-financial favors 
unrelated to NAFTA used to secure the votes five 
representatives. These favors included help with campaign 
fundraising, the promise of prison transfers, and the 
extradition of an accused rapist. Members receiving these 
favors would be assigned a score of one. Because there are 
only four such favors recorded it is almost impossible to test 
the efficacy of this approach. It is not included in the 
final probit model.
The variable Geography divides the nation into five 
different areas. The first, coded as a one, is comprised of 
states that border Mexico. The second, coded two, is composed
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of the west coast states. The third geographical grouping is 
composed of states that define the southeast. The fourth is 
made up of states that border Canada. Finally, the industrial 
northeast and the "rustbelt" states make up the last grouping. 
I hypothesize that the states that border Mexico and the 
southeast would be more likely to support NAFTA because they 
are parts of the U.S. that are growing. The northeast and the 
rustbelt states have recently experienced a decline in 
productivity and population. Industries and workers in these 
areas felt most threatened by NAFTA. I therefore hypothesize 
that they would be predisposed to oppose the agreement.
The variable labor describes the amount of campaign 
support a member received from labor unions and members. 
Using figures that include both PAC and individual 
contributions of $200 or more, the dollar amount is recorded 
in thousands of dollars, rounded off to the nearest thousand. 
I hypothesize that members^ who receive large contributions 
from labor unions would be more likely to oppose NAFTA because 
labor unions were so hostile to NAFTA and saw it as a threat 
to their livelihood.
The Perot support variable includes districts where Perot 
did best in his bid for the presidency in 1992. In these 
seventy three districts Perot won between thirty three and 
twenty five percent of the vote. Because of Perot's vocal 
opposition to the treaty, it will be interesting to see how 
these districts voted, especially those in the southeast,
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which by geography seem predisposed to support the treaty.
Additionally, I look at the percent margin won by a 
member of Congress in the last election. Called margin, these 
percentages should help define who has a relatively secure 
seat in Congress. I hypothesize that members who are more 
secure would be more willing to vote for an unpopular treaty 
among their constituents because they have more political 
security and capital. Similarly, I look at the number of 
terms served by individual members of Congress. Terms help 
define who has seniority in Congress. I hypothesize that 
senior members of Congress can have a great deal of influence 
on junior members, especially on controversial votes. 
Although this trend seems to be waning, they are still in many 
cases cue-givers to other members. Moreover, I believe that 
senior members have more electoral security which could 
contribute to their taking a more risky position with fewer 
electoral repercussions.
I also look at members of the Congressional Black Caucus. 
The Caucus is a legislative service organization dedicated to 
improving the conditions of African-Americans through the 
legislative process. I hope to learn whether this minority 
had any predisposition for or against NAFTA. I look at this 
group because in many cases, districts represented by African- 
Americans contain large numbers of blue collar wage workers 
who would be predisposed to dislike the treaty. Additionally, 
I believe that this variable will also help measure the
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disposition of urban districts. (In many cases, black members 
of Congress represent largely urban populations.) Many urban 
areas have been in economic decline in recent years and would 
thus fear the emigration of businesses.
The education of a district is measured here by the 
percent of the district that is college educated. I 
hypothesize that districts that are more educated are more 
inclined to support NAFTA, both because of the educational 
level and the degree of wealth that usually accompanies 
education. More educated districts would be more likely to 
see the longer term benefits of the treaty. Additionally, 
people with higher levels of education tend to be 
professionals (as opposed to blue collar wage workers) and 
thus would feel less threatened by the agreement.
Finally, the role of partisanship is examined. I hope to 
learn what if any influence party affiliation had on the vote. 
The treaty was drafted under a republican administration and 
its terms seemed at first to appeal largely to classic 
republican interests.
The interaction of these aforementioned variables would 
in large part determine a member's probability of supporting 
NAFTA. More crucial to this study, though, will be tests 
addressing the effectiveness of the various types of 
bargaining employed by the president on his ability to pass 
NAFTA.
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TABLE 1 
Variables in Model
VARIABLE DEFINITION EXPECTED VALUE (+) OR (-)
"PARTIC" ( + ) Particularistic benefits or side payments
"MODS" (-) Modifications or amendments to the treaty
"PARTY" ( + ) Partisan affiliation: democrat or republican
"GEOG" (-> Which state legislator represents, divided into 
five categories: West Coast, states bordering 
Mexico, the southeast, states bordering Canada, 
and the industrial northeast and rustbelt 
states.
"LABOR" (-> Amount, in thousands of dollars, a 
representative received from labor unions and 
union members.
"EDUC" ( + ) Educational level of individual districts, 
measured by percent college educated
"BLACK" (-) Member of the Congressional Black Caucus
=====*The variables below were removed from the probit 
equation after they proved insignificant (p > .05) in
determining vote.
"FAVORS" ( + ) Miscellaneous non-financial favors
"PEROT" (-) Districts where Perot won the greatest number 
of votes in his 1992 bid for the presidency.
"MARGIN" ( + ) Percent margin won by member of Congress in the 
last election.
"TERMS" ( + ) Number of terms served by individual
lecH siators
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Data Analysis
According to the data, sixty-one members of Congress won 
concessions from the president in the form of modifications. 
These members represent 14.1 percent of the House of 
Representatives. Of these sixty-one people, forty seven voted 
in favor of NAFTA (10.8 percent of the House and 70.7 percent 
of everyone offered modifications respectively). In other 
words, of the two hundred thirty-four votes that passed NAFTA, 
forty-seven of them came from members who won modifications. 
However, of the two hundred members who voted against the 
treaty, fourteen of them were also offered modifications.
VOTE
NO
YES
COL. TOTAL
Statistic
Significance
FIGURE 1 
MODIFICATIONS
NONE RECEIVED MODIFICATIONS
186 14
187 47
61373
85.9%
Value
ROW TOTAL
200
46.1%
234
53.9%
434
14.1% 100% 
A o o r o x
Phi
Cramer1s V
.18767
.18767
. 0 0 0 0 9  *1
. 0 0 0 0 9  *1
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In order to learn whether the two variables are 
independent of each other the Pearson chi-square is examined. 
In this case the Pearson chi-square value is 15.3 with one 
degree of freedom.57 If vote and modifications were 
independent, the probability that a random sample would result 
in a chi-square value of that magnitude is .00009. Thus the 
assumption that these two variables are independent can be 
rejected.58 Thus, we can assume that modifications to the 
treaty explain some of the yes votes.
57This statistic is calculated by summing over all cells 
the squared residuals (observed minus expected frequencies) 
divided by the expected frequencies. The calculated chi- 
square is then compared to the critical points of the 
theoretical chi-square distribution to produce an estimate of 
how likely the calculated value is if the variables are truly 
independent.
58In a two by two table, the phi coefficient (Pearson chi- 
square divided by the sample size and subsequently square 
rooted) is equal to the Pearson correlation coefficient. In 
this case, a Phi of .188 suggests that although the variables 
are obviously linked, modifications to the treaty are not an 
especially great explanatory factor. This is perhaps because 
of the number of people who received modifications and voted 
yes relative to the number of people who did not receive 
modifications and also voted yes. The yes votes of the latter 
group must be explained by other factors. This problem, 
demonstrated in the modifications crosstabs are also evident 
when vote and particularistic benefits are crosstabulated. 
For this reason, a probit analysis was executed.
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Phi
Cramer1s V
FIGURE 2 
PARTICULARISTIC BENEFIT
VOTE NONE BENEFIT ROW TOTAL
YES 194
40
234
53.9
NO
200
0
200
46.1
COLUMN TOTAL
394
90.8%
40
9.2%
434
100%
Statistic Value Approx. Sianificance
.29457
.29457
.00000 *1 
.00000 *1
In Figure 2.1 we can see that forty members of Congress 
received side payments and all of them voted yes to NAFTA. It 
seems at first impressive that there were no votes in this 
group against the treaty; however, all the "side payments yes 
voters” only account for 9.2 percent of the entire affirmative 
vote. Not all of those who voted yes received particularistic 
benefits and not all of those who voted no did so because they
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did not receive any benefits. In any case, the Pearson's chi- 
square coefficient reveals that the variables are not 
independent and that the Phi (strength of association) is 
somewhat stronger at .295.
Preliminary crosstabulations of vote and party 
affiliation reveal that a majority of Democrats voted against 
NAFTA while a majority of Republicans voted for it. Of the 
234 votes for the treaty, 75.4 percent came from Republicans 
while only 39.4 percent came from Democrats.
FIGURE 3
PARTISANSHIP
VOTE
YES
NO
DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN
132
102
43
157
COLUMN TOTAL
259
59.7
175
40.3
ROW TOTAL
234
53.9%
200
46.1%
434
100%
39
Examination of the geography variable yields results 
similar to those expected. Half of all votes in support of 
NAFTA came from states that border Mexico, west coast states 
and the southeast. In individual areas, 76.1 percent of the 
districts in states bordering Mexico voted yes, 58.1 percent 
of west coast districts voted yes while 54.9 percent of 
southeastern state districts voted yes. States bordering 
Canada and the industrial northeast were responsible for 
almost half (47 percent) of the no votes. Somewhat 
surprisingly, 37.7 percent of the industrial northeast and 
rustbelt voted for the treaty.
FIGURE 4
GEOGRAPHIC REGION
VOTE OTHER BORDER WEST SOUTH­ BORDER NOR.EAST ROW
MEXICO COAST EAST CANADA RUSTBELT TOT.
63 54 18 45 8 46 234
YES 14.5 12.4 4.1 10.4 1.8 10.6 53.9
NO 39 17 13 37 18 76 200
9.0 3.9 3.0 8.5 4.1 17.5 46.1
COLUMN 102 71 31 82 26 122 434
TOTAL 23.5 16.4 7.1 18.9 6.0 28.1 100%
Statistic Value Approx. Significance
Phi
Cramer's V
.28516
.28516
. 0 0 0 0 0  *1
. 0 0 0 0 0  *1
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The variable describing labor support was broken down into 
categories to facilitate crosstab analysis. The six 
categories include labor support to legislators in the amounts 
of zero dollars to fifty thousand, fifty-one thousand to one 
hundred thousand, one hundred one thousand to one hundred 
fifty thousand, continuing up by increments of fifty thousand 
dollars until four hundred thousand. (Row totals of 196 "no" 
votes and 2 32 "yes" votes are the result of missing data. 
Data was unavailable on six House members.) An analysis of 
existing data, though, suggests that labor support is an 
important variable, given the Phi value of .430.
FIGURE 5
LABOR CATEGORIES
VOTE $0—50K $51- $101- $151- $201- $301- ROW
100K 150K 200K 300K 400K TOTAL
YES 178 33 10 8 3 1 232
41.6% 7.7% 2.3% 1.9% .7% .2% 54.2%
68 71 35 13 8 0 196
NO 15.9% 16.6% 8.2% 3.0% 1.9% 45.8%
COL. 246 104 45 21 11 1 428
TOTAL 57.5% 24.3% 10.5% 4.9% 2.6% .2% 100%
Statistic Value A p p r o x .
Significance
Phi .42950 .00000 *1
Cramer's V .42950 .00000 *1
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It is interesting to note that an overwhelming majority 
of yes votes came from members of Congress who received the 
least support from labor unions and their members. (178 of 
the 232 yes votes recorded.) Legislators in this category 
were twice as likely to vote in support of the treaty and 
members receiving one hundred fifty one thousand dollars or 
more were twice as likely to oppose it.
To illustrate the role of race, the variable "Black” 
(members of the Congressional Black Caucus) was crosstabulated 
with the vote in Figure 6.1. The tables reveal that an 
overwhelming majority of members (77.8 percent) voted against 
the treaty. It is hard to know whether this is a result of 
the urban nature of. most of these districts or because of a 
race related issue. In my judgement, the former offers the 
best explanation because many urban districts have experienced 
a decline in productivity and would worry about losing 
businesses because of increased competition and relocation.
FIGURE 6
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MEMBERS OF BLACK CAUCUS
VOTE NON MEMBER MEMBER ROW TOTAL
8 234
YES 226
53.9%
172 200
NO 28
46.1
COLUMN 398 36 434
TOTAL 91.7% 8.3% 100%
• Analysis of a crosstabulation of vote with Perot support 
offers some interesting insights. It appears that
constituencies that supported Perot were no less likely to 
oppose the treaty. In fact, 64.4 percent of Perot's strongest 
districts voted for NAFTA. (See Figure 7.1) This can perhaps 
be explained by geography. Many of the districts that 
supported him were in the south (Florida Texas) and Rocky 
Mountain regions (Utah, Nevada, Colorado), areas that are 
growing and stand to benefit from NAFTA. It would seem that 
Perot, despite his 1992 popularity in these districts, 
appealed only to districts that were predisposed to dislike 
the treaty.
FIGURE 7
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PEROT
VOTE OTHERS PEROT DISTRICT ROW TOTAL
YES
187 47
234
53.9%
NO
174 26
200
46.1%
COLUMN 361 73 434
TOTAL • 83.2% 16.8% 100%
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A regression analysis assumes homogeneous variance, 
variable independence, and linearity. Because the dependent 
variable, the vote on NAFTA, is a dichotomous variable, 
standard OLS residuals will exhibit nonconstant variance and 
the model will not have random errors above and below the 
regression line nor will the errors be normally distributed. 
A probit analysis is the appropriate non-linear regression 
model.
Preliminary logit and probit analyses revealed that only 
six of the original eleven variables are significant. The 
variable "FAVORS" had too few cases, while "PEROT," "MARGIN," 
and "TERMS" were not significant at the .05 level. The 
variable PARTIC posed unique problems because of the small 
number of people receiving side payments and voting yes 
relative to all the members of Congress who voted yes for 
other reasons. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
there is no variation in the "vote" variable among members who 
got side payments. It is thus difficult to discern the actual 
significance of particularistic benefits. According to the 
results in Figure 8.1,though, it appears that the variable is 
not statistically significant.
In the final model, statistically significant variables 
include modifications, party affiliation, educational level of 
the district, labor support, geographical area, and membership 
in the Congressional Black Caucus. (See Figure 8.1)
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FIGURE 8
PROBIT MODEL
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES
LOG-LIKELIHOOD..................  -210.4976
RESTRICTED (SLOPES = 0) LOG L... -299.4927
CHI SQUARED (7)................  177.9902
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL.............. 0.000000
N [ 0 ,1 ] USED FOR SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-RATIO PROB\T\X STD.DEVX
BLACK -1.0674 0.3461 -3.084 0.00204 0.27612
EDUC 0.21185E—01 0.6749E-02 3.139 0.000169 11.071
LABOR —0.49787E—02 0.5179E—02 -3.153 0.00162 60.975
GEOG -0.15747 0.3670E-01 -4.291 0.00002 1.9499
MODS 0.64503 0.2187 2.949 0.00319 0.34796
PARTY 0.58782 0.1850 3.178 0.00148 0.49111
PARTIC 6.0124 42.55 .141 0.88762 0.28959
Constant -0.56325 0.3368 -1.673 0.09441
Frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
ACTUAL 0
PREDICTED
1 TOTAL
0 142 58 200
1 51 183 234
TOTAL 193 241 434
The significance of the education variable is perhaps a 
result of greater education making people more predisposed to 
support NAFTA or perhaps a result of other socio-economic 
variables correlated with education (higher socio-economic 
status). It is also possible that these variables are related 
to partisanship. If wealthier districts tend to be more 
republican, it is possible that the variables PARTY and EDUC 
are somewhat collinear if education and wealth of the district 
are related. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell from the 
data available.
The entire model has a Chi-squared value of 177.9902, 
suggesting that it has explanatory value. Substantively, this 
means that the vote on NAFTA can be explained in large part by 
the socio-economic variables such as educational level, type 
of job (measured by LABOR variable), race (which, it must be 
noted, also reflects other socio-economic or demographic 
characteristics), partisanship, as well as geographical region 
and finally, modifications made to the treaty. Of all of 
these variables, the only one the president can control is 
modifications to the treaty. As expected, the more money a 
member of Congress received from labor PACs and unions, the 
less likely he or she was to vote for the treaty, demonstrated 
in the negative coefficient value. Similarly, the more 
educated a district was (higher levels of college graduates), 
the more likely the representative was to support NAFTA. It 
is possible that the education variable is actually measuring
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the relative wealth of a district because of the higher 
incomes which accompany greater education.
The model predicted 193 "no" votes and 241 "yes" votes. 
This is very close to the actual vote count of 200 "no" votes 
and 232 "yes" votes. This is another indication that the has 
some predictive value.
Conclusions
A general overview of the data suggests if we simply 
subtract the votes of representatives who received any of the 
three types of benefits, it appears that NAFTA would have 
failed to pass. NAFTA passed, though, by a margin of 234 to 
200.59 It appears Clinton found support "in the centrist and 
Sun Belt House districts that had given him little comfort in 
the past."60 This is where he found the vast majority of 
Democratic votes for NAFTA.
NAFTA actually fared worst in House districts where 
Clinton won the most votes in November 1992. Clinton's 
political base in the presidential election was quite 
different from his NAFTA coalition. He won nineteen states in 
the election that he did not carry in the NAFTA debate.61 In 
fact, Democrats who voted against NAFTA came from districts
59"House Votes," Congressional Quarterly. (20 November, 
1993) p. 3225.
60Jon Healey and Thomas H. Moore, "Clinton Forms New 
Coalition to Win NAFTA's Approval," Congressional Quarterly.
(20 November, 1993) p. 3181.
61I b i d .
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that, on average, gave Clinton more than fifty percent of the 
vote last November. In the election, Clinton won electoral 
support in inner-city or black majority districts, most of 
whom voted overwhelmingly against NAFTA. Districts where 
Clinton fared worst in the election provided more than half 
the votes for NAFTA. This is perhaps because NAFTA was a 
originally a Republican initiative.
Anti-NAFTA Republicans tended to come from import 
sensitive or high immigration areas and regions with high 
levels of blue collar workers.62 In general, very few votes 
came from the northern border, the industrial Midwest and 
Northeast and the inner cities. Yes votes tended to come from 
the nation's western and southern borders, the Rocky Mountain 
districts, wheat producing central states and the Southeast. 
NAFTA was also the first vote where Clinton had to seek 
substantial Republican support. Interestingly, Democrats who 
supported NAFTA tended to come from areas where Republican 
influence is growing.63
This seems to suggest that Clinton was able to patch 
together a diverse coalition based more on socio-economic 
variables than on party or popularity. He bargained to win 
the votes of undecided representatives who would possibly have 
supported him anyway because of certain socio-economic 
characteristics in their districts. He did, however, win over
62Ibid. , 3183
63 Ibid.
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some representatives who did not share the characteristic 
variables mentioned above. In sum, this evidence seems to 
suggest that in order to form a winning coalition in Congress 
now, Presidents must cultivate the support of whomever they 
can. They cannot rely on party discipline or even pork when 
dealing with an emotional and controversial issue. Although 
Clinton's other initiatives during this administration were 
supported overwhelmingly by Democrats, support for 
controversial pieces of legislation will depend largely on 
other variables. It is on these pieces of legislation that 
the president must do most of his bargaining. Indeed, far 
from being an anomaly, the dealmaking during NAFTA was 
business as usual, simply more explicit and publicized.
What conclusions can be drawn from the data available? 
What insight can it offer a president who wants to pass a 
future treaty agreement (i.e. GATT)? First of all, it seems 
that side payments, so reviled by the press and so seemingly 
important to the passage of the agreement, were not as 
important as the modifications to the agreement. Although 
this seems to contradict conventional wisdom, these 
modifications were more significant to the final passage of 
the bill.
Members of Congress, it seems, cannot simply accept pork 
barrel and expect their constituents to accept the terms of an 
agreement they find unacceptable. In order to placate their 
constituencies, members of Congress have historically brought
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pork barrel projects home to their districts. In cases of 
highly emotional and divisive issues, however, this tactic 
does little to placate angry districts. Legislators must 
listen and respond to their constituents. District projects, 
while appreciated, do not draw attention away from the larger 
issue. A member of Congress who expected to avoid any 
political backlash for supporting a treaty unpopular with the 
majority of his district by providing pork would be 
politically vulnerable at the next election. A legislator 
whose primary goal is reelection would not want to be 
associated with an unpopular law or treaty.
Trade agreements like NAFTA are negotiated by presidents 
with fast track authority. In order to make up for 
legislators' inability to influence the provisions of the 
treaty presidents are usually subject to more demands for 
favors and side payments when the agreement comes to a final 
vote. The analysis in this paper suggests that a president 
would expend less political capital if he considers the wishes 
of Congress before and during negotiations, despite fast track 
authority. In this way a president could defuse some 
opposition early and save side payments to persuade members of 
Congress to support him on parts of the treaty they oppose and 
he is unwilling to compromise on. Pork will be doled out more 
judiciously and the president will save money, political 
capital, and his reputation. He will be able to pass 
legislation without looking as though he is scrambling for
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votes and bribing legislators. Because Congress and the 
president have different constituencies they will have 
different perspectives and goals in treaty negotiations. 
Because they both share responsibility for treaties an element 
of compromise is necessary. A president, who ultimately has 
less power because of his inability to make treaties law, 
should compromise on the exact terms of the treaty so that it 
will pass in Congress. These compromises would be more 
effective and less expensive than most side payments, and they 
would facilitate smooth passage of the treaty. This would 
enhance the reputation of the president. A president who can 
balance compromise and integrity by the use of modifications 
and side payments will probably be able to negotiate the best 
treaties for Congress, the president, and, most importantly, 
the interests of the general public.
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NAFTA DEALS
It is estimated that the deals made could cost taxpayers as 
much as $50 billion.1
Particularistic Benefits
1. The Highway Deal: Transportation Secretary Frederico Pena
made a private commitment to link the Golden State and
Antelope Valley Freeways.
Target Vote: Howard P. McKeon (R-CA)
2. The Plutonium Project Deal: Energy Secretary Hazel
O'Leary announced his intention to place a government funded 
laboratory dedicated to exploring "the positive side of 
plutonium" in Texas.
Target Vote: Bill Sarpalius (D-TX)
3. The Shipyard Deal: The administration promised to
support for a $1.2 billion maritime subsidy program which 
would direct government funding into a shipyard in Quincy, MA.
Target Vote: Gerry Studds (D-MA)
4. The Manufacturing Technology Center Deal: President
Clinton pledged that Rep. Payne's district would get "top 
level consideration" for a manufacturing technology center.
Target Vote: Lewis F. Payne (D-VA)
5. The Community Development Deal: President Clinton gave a
"philosophical commitment" to Rep. Flake's Queens district 
for a Small business Administration lending program.
Target Vote: Floyd Flake (D-NY)
6. The Dredging Deal: NAFTA supporter Peter King learned
the week before the vote that the Army Corps of Engineers was 
blocking a dredging project at Jones Beach in his Long Island 
district. He called the White House to complain and the 
administration quickly responded with a letter informing him 
that the project would go forward.
Target Vote: Peter King (D-NY)
7. The Plane Deal: The administration promised two
additional C-17 military cargo planes to be built in Rep. E.B. 
Johnson's district.
Target Vote: E.B. Johnson (D-TX)
8. The White House promised to sit the 10 million dollar 
Center for the Study of Trade in ;the Western Hemisphere in 
Rep. Pickle's district.
Target Vote: J.J. Pickle (D-TX)
1Sarah Anderson and Ken Silverstein, "Oink, Oink," The Nation 
(20 November, 1993), p. 752.
9. Two international air routes to London awarded to 
American Airlines, which serves major cities in the states of 
the target votes.
Target Vote: David Price (D-NC)
Tim Valentine (D-NC)
Bob Clement (D-TN)
10. Administration caved in on a plan to raise grazing fees 
on federal lands.
Target Vote: Bob Smith (R-OR)
Joel Hefley (R-CO)
Wayne Allard (R-CO)
Bob Stump (R-AZ)
11. Administration pressured Mexico to hasten tariff 
reduction on appliances to benefit Iowa based firms.
Target Vote: Ted Grandy (R-Ia)
Neal Smith (R-Ia)
12. $16 million to complete an agricultural research center 
in Ft. Pierce, Florida.
Target Vote: Porter Goss (R-FL)
Dan Miller (R-FL)
Tom Lewis (R-FL)
Harry Johnston (D-FL)
Jim Bacchus (D-FL)
Carrie Meek (D-FL)
Alcee Hastings (D-FL)
Earl Hutto (D-FL)
Tillie Fowler (R-FL)
William Jefferson (D-LA)
James Hayes (D-LA)
Jim McCrery (R-LA)
13. Clinton agreed to reduce proposed new taxes on airline 
and cruise ship passenger fares that were to fund retraining 
for workers displaced by NAFTA.
Target Vote: Thomas Ewing (R-IL)
Jennifer Dunn (R-WA)
Ron Packard (R-CA)
Sam Johnson ((R-TX)
Dennis Hastert (R-IL)
Wayne Allard (R-CO)
14. Clinton1 agreed to reverse his earlier recommendation to 
cut $47 million in helium subsidies.
Target Vote: Bill Sarpalius (D-TX)
15. Administration promises to protect Michigan asparagus 
growers.
Target Vote: Peter Hoekstra (R-MI)
16. Administration promises to pressure Canadian government 
to diminish subsidies for a Quebec chemical plant.
Target Vote: Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD)
Modifications to the Agreement
1. Textile and Apparel Deals: The Administration promised
a number of concessions to the textile industry in a letter to 
Congressional Textile Caucus Chairman John Spratt (D-SC).
These included additional funding of $15 million for U.S. 
Customs to enforce laws on textile imports. The
administration also pledged to push for five additional years 
of protection for U.S. textiles at the GATT talks.
Target Vote: W.G. Hefner (D-NC)
Howard Coble (R-NC)
John S. Tanner (D-TN)
Blanche Lambert (D-AR)
Marilyn Lloyd (D-TN)
J. Roy Rowland (D-GA)
Herbert H. Bateman (R-VA)
Don Johnson (D-GA)
Nathan Deal (D-GA)
John Spratt (D-SC)
George Darden (D-GA)
Lewis F. Payne (D-VA)
2. The Methyl Bromide Deal: To win the votes of Florida
Representatives, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor wrote 
a letter to Florida fruit and vegetable growers assuring them 
they could continue to use the pesticide methyl bromide until 
at least the' year 2000.
Target Vote: The Florida Delegation
Hutto (u)
Peterson (D)
Brown (D)
Fowler (R)
Thurman (D)
Stearns -(R)
Mica (R)
McCollum (R)
Bilirakis (R)
Young (R)
Gibbons (D)
Canady (R)
Miller (R)
Goss (R)
Bacchus (D)
Lewis (R)
Meek (D)
Ros-Lehtinen (R)
Johnston (D)
Deutch (D)
Diaz-Balart (R)
Shaw (R)
Hastings (D)
3. The Peanut Butter and Paste Deal: In a letter to Glenn 
English President Clinton promised that the International 
Trade Commission would investigate whether peanut imports are 
damaging domestic industry.
Target Vote: Glenn English (D-OK)
Bill Sarpalius (D-TX)
4. The administration agreed to negotiate limits on peanut 
butter imports from Canada.
Target Vote: Roy Rowland (D-GA)
4. The Flat Glass Deal: The White House secured a promise
from Mexico to meet to discuss accelerated tariff reductions 
on flat glass.
Target Vote: Martin Frost (D-TX)
David Hobson (R-OH)
5. The California Wine Deal: The administration secured a 
promise by the Mexican government for future discussions of 
tariff reductions on wine.
Target Vote: Anna Eshoo (D-CA)
Bill Baker (R-CA)
George Brown (D-CA)
Richard Lehman (D-CA)
Norman Mineta (D-CA)
6. The Tomatoes and Peppers Deal: The administration
required the International Trade Commission to monitor imports 
of tomatoes and peppers until 2009. This provision is
designed to enable quick enforcement of the "snap back" 
provision.
Target Vote: The Florida Delegation, see 2.
7. The Durum Wheat Deal: Clinton promised the government
would investigate transportation and other subsidies used by 
Canadian growers of durum wheat.
Target Vote: William Sarpalius (D-TX)
Glenn English (D-OK)
8. The Broomcorn Brooms Deal: The administration promised
an executive branch review of any adverse impact the broomcorn
industry may bear as a result of NAFTA
Target Vote: Dave Hobson (R-OH)
9. The Cut Flower Industry Deal: The White House put a
provision in the NAFTA implementing legislation which requires 
the Secretary of Agriculture to collect information "if 
reasonably available" on cut flower production, import, and 
export data.
Target Vote: Norman Mineta (D-CA)
10. The Energy Deal: Clinton promised that there would be no
renegotiations of energy provisions. This was to assure that 
New England would be guaranteed continued access to Canadian
energy.
Target Vote: Edward Markey (D-MA)
11. The Beef, Peanut, and Wheat Transhipment Deal: Customs 
Commissioner George J. Weise wrote a letter promising that the 
agency would take enforcement actions to prevent other 
countries from using Canada an Mexico as export platforms for 
beef, wheat, and peanuts.
Target Vote: Glenn English (D-OH)
12. The Sugar Deal: To win support in the Louisiana 
delegation, the administration cut a deal with Mexico to 
protect U.S. markets from being flooded with Mexican sugar 
imports.
Target Vote: Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD)
The Louisiana Delegation:
Livingston (R)
Jefferson (D)
Tauzin (D)
Fields (D)
McCrery (R)
Baker (R)
Hayes (D)
13. The Bank Deal: The administration promised the creation 
of a development bank for the Mexican American border and 
promised millions of extra dollars to help poor communities 
hurt by NAFTA.
Target Vote: Esteban Torres (D-CA)
Xavier Becerra (D-CA)
Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)
Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA)
Ed Pastor (D-AZ)
John Bryant (D-TX)
Other Hispanic Votes Targeted:
Ortiz (D-TX)
Martinez (D-CA)
Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)
Roybal (D-CA)
Richardson (D-NM)
Serrano (D-NY) 
de la Garza (D-TX)
14. The administration devised a worker retaining program.
Target Vote: Members worried about unemployment.
Favors
1. Fundraising: Vice President Gore attended a Boston 
fundraising event for Marty T. Meehan.
Target Vote: Marty T. Meehan (D-MA)
2. Fundraising: White House Chief of Staff Mac McLarty 
appeared at a Chicago fundraiser for Mel Reynolds. Mr.
Reynolds also was appointed to a special position with the 
Democratic Nation Committee.
Target Vote: Mel Reynolds (D-IL)
3. To win the vote of Clay Shaw, the administration secured 
a promise from the Mexican attorney General Jorge Carpiso to 
extradite an accused rapist if he is caught "and found to be 
extraditable by Mexican judicial authorities." The accused 
rapist allegedly abducted and raped Shaw's secretary's niece.
Target Vote: Clay Shaw (R-FL)
4. Prisoner Transfer: The Justice Department made a
commitment to deport Mexican immigrants serving in U.S. 
prisons.
Target Votes: Jay Kim (R-CA)
Carlos Moorhead (R-CA)
Rebuffs:
1. Lawmakers form North Carolina tried to win a reduction in 
the proposed 75 cent tax on cigarettes that the administration 
wanted to finance health care. Clinton did not budge. In the 
end, eight out of the twelve North Carolina members supported 
NAFTA.
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